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INVITED ARTICLES
Constructive Criticism

Ronald C. Serlin
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Attempts to attain knowledge as certified true belief have failed to circumvent Hume’s injunction against
induction. Theories must be viewed as unprovable, improbable, and undisprovable. The empirical basis is
fallible, and yet the method of conjectures and refutations is untouched by Hume’s insights. The implications
for statistical methodology is that the requisite severity of testing is achieved through the use of robust
procedures, whose assumptions have not been shown to be substantially violated, to test predesignated range
null hypotheses. Nonparametric range null hypothesis tests need to be developed to examine whether or not
effect sizes or measures of association, as well as distributional assumptions underlying the tests themselves,
meet satisficing criteria.
Keywords: Probability, knowledge, satisficing, statistical methodology

Introduction

and Pascal were credited (by many historians of
probability) with its mathematical development.
Although many modern philosophical problems
had been addressed by Aristotle, Socrates, and
Protagoras, the interplay between probability
and philosophy did not begin in earnest until the
end of the seventeenth century and did not give
birth to what Stigler (1986) called the infant
discipline of statistics until 1900.
One reason for this fairly long dalliance
is that it was not clear how the information
provided by a probabilistic analysis could
warrant knowledge claims, claims that at the
time required justification as certain and true.
Only slowly did probable knowledge get
recognized as having any veracity, and this on a
secondary level as opinion or belief. By the end
of the eighteenth century, philosophers began to
view even the possibility of acquiring certain
knowledge of the real world as uncertain at best.
It was only in the middle of the nineteenth
century, when the philosophical focus shifted
from the justification of the source of scientific
knowledge to the validity of the methods of
science, that the true romance between

In the middle of the seventeenth century,
a remarkable confluence of scientists,
mathematicians, and philosophers laid the
foundations for the theory of probability and
formulated new philosophical underpinnings for
the justification of claims to knowledge. These
individuals knew one another, posed problems
as challenges to one another, and criticized and
defended the work of one another. Although
investigations in probability had been conducted
for well over two hundred years before, Fermat
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probability and philosophy blossomed in the
testing of scientific theories.
This relationship continues to flourish,
and the occasional disagreements are healthy,
for “statistics requires a dynamic balance
between its philosophical underpinnings and its
practice to remain vital” (Kadane, 1976, p. 735).
In order better to understand this balance and to
maintain and strengthen the vitality of the
applied and theoretical aspects of modern
statistics, it will be helpful to examine the
history of probability and its joint effort with
philosophy of science. Such study will
encourage researchers in statistical theory and
methods to focus on problems whose solutions
are essential to the continued health of the
scientific enterprise, it will allow those
researchers to avoid repeating mistakes of the
past, and it is hoped that it will engender an
appreciation for the incredible insights and
magnificent oversights of our scientific
forebears.
As Stigler wrote (1986), “the advances
in scientific logic that took place in statistics
before 1900 were to be every bit as influential as
those associated with the names of Newton and
Darwin” (p. 361). Indeed, even though Newton
dabbled in probability theory, and Darwin=s
indirect affect on statistics through his cousin,
Francis Galton, is well known, less well known
perhaps are Newton=s and Darwin=s influence on
philosophers of science and statistics. An
understanding of these kinds of mutual
influences of statisticians and philosophers may
help to limn modern statistics in a new yet
joyously familiar way, “...a recognition, the
known appearing fully itself, and more itself
than one knew” (Levertov, 1961).
Origins of Probability Theory
According to Walker (1927), the
foundations of the theory of probability were
laid by Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in
1654 in response to two questions asked of
Pascal by Antoine Gombauld, the Chevalier de
Mere, Sieur de Baussay. As with many, if not
most, scientific advances, the work of Pascal and
Fermat culminated the efforts of other scientists
and mathematicians that had been accruing over
a period of hundreds of years. Pascal and Fermat
were first brought together through the auspices

of Pierre de Carcavi and Marin Mersenne.
Mathematicians, including Pierre Gassendi,
Pierre de Carcavi, Gilles Roberval, Rene
Descartes, and Blaise Pascal=s father, Etienne,
met at Mersenne=s house once a week. Etienne
introduced Blaise to the Mersenne Academy
when Blaise was fourteen years old. Carcavi
brought his friend Fermat, with whom he served
in parliament in Toulouse, into correspondence
with Mersenne and the others in 1636, and he
suggested that Etienne and Roberval write to
Fermat regarding their questions into methods of
integration and centers of gravity. When
Descartes criticized (erroneously) Fermat’s
method of finding tangents, it was Etienne and
Roberval who defended him. Carcavi also first
put Fermat and Blaise Pascal in touch with one
another (David, 1962).
One of the questions that de Mere asked,
known as the problem of points, concerned the
fair distribution of stakes between two players
when a game they were playing was interrupted
mid-contest. The problem of points had been
solved more than 250 years beforehand in some
works by Antonio de Mazzinghi from around
1400 (Kiernan, 2001). The first time that the
problem appeared in a mathematical work, it
was solved incorrectly by Pacioli in 1494
(David, 1962; Kiernan, 2001). Cardano, who
offered his own solution in 1539 (four years
before Copernicus published his heliocentric
theory!), referred to Pacioli=s error as one that a
child should recognize.
Unfortunately, Cardano’s solution was
wrong. In 1556, Tartaglia again took up the
problem of points, commenting that Cardano’s
solution didn’t make sense. Kiernan (2001, p.
181) notes that Tartaglia’s answer was “way
off”, as well. Peverone in 1558 also attempted to
solve the problem and failed, but according to
David (1962), M. G. Kendall called this one of
the near misses of history. It was not until Pascal
and Fermat discussed the problem in a series of
letters during the summer of 1654 that a correct
solution was again found. This time the problem
of points was solved in three different ways, one
by Fermat using the enumeration of all cases,
one by Pascal that used the process of recursion,
and a second solution by Pascal using his
arithmetic triangle. (The use of a triangular array
such as Pascal=s triangle to determine binomial
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coefficients appeared in works by Chu Shihchieh in 1303, Apianus in 1527, Stifel in 1545,
and Tartaglia in 1556. According to David,
1962, Fermat dealt with it in 1636, which is
perhaps the reason that Fisher has referred to it
as Fermat=s triangle.)
The second question posed by de Mere
and solved by Fermat and Pascal dealt with
probabilities associated with dice. He asked
Pascal (and Roberval) why the probability of
throwing at least one six in four rolls of a fair die
was in the ratio 671 to 625, whereas the
probability of obtaining at least one pair of sixes
in twenty-four rolls of two dice was less than
0.5. Because the expected number of sixes rolled
in four rolls of a single die is the same as the
expected number of pairs of sixes in twenty-four
rolls of two dice, the unequal probabilities that
de Mere discovered led him, according to
Pascal, to think he had found a “falsehood in the
theory of numbers” and that “Arithmetic is selfcontradictory” (cited in David, 1962, p. 88-89).
That de Mere was able to distinguish empirically
between two probabilities whose true values are
0.4914 and 0.5177, concluding that the former
was less than 0.5, indicates that he was an
assiduous gambler and note-taker.
Dice of reasonable quality are known to
have existed since about 3000 B.C., used chiefly
at the time in religious rites (David, 1962). A
complete enumeration of the various outcomes
on three dice appeared in a thirteenth century
poem attributed to Fournival (David, 1962), and
a 1477 commentary by Libri on Dante’s Divine
Comedy contains the first indication of the
probabilities of various throws in a three-dice
game of hazard (Todhunter, 1865). Cardano,
however, possibly in concert with Ferrari,
introduced
in
about
1526
(published
posthumously in 1663) “the idea of
combinations to enumerate all the elements of
the fundamental probability set” and noticed that
if all elements are equiprobable the ratio of
favorable to total numbers of cases gives a result
“in accordance with experience” (David, 1962,
p. 58).
From this, David (1962) concluded that
Cardano was the first mathematician to correctly
calculate
a
theoretical
probability.
Unfortunately, Cardano was incorrect in his
solution of what was essentially de Mere=s
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second question. Galileo also took up the subject
of dice games and published a fragment on them
in around 1620 (David, 1962). His benefactor, to
whom Galileo was Mathematician to his
Serenest Highness, Cosimo II of Tuscany, had
posed a problem that had been solved by
Cardano and that was similar to that posed by de
Mere: Why, in the throwing of three dice, is the
number of partitions of 9 and 10 the same,
though their probability in practice was not
equal, with 9 being the less probable (David,
1962)? (His Serenest Highness was almost as
discerning as de Mere, being able to distinguish
between probabilities of 0.116 and 0.125.)
We can see that the topics addressed by
Pascal and Fermat had a long history before the
summer of 1654. Nevertheless, as Todhunter
(1865) commented, “neglecting the trifling hints
which may be found in preceding writers, we
may say that the Theory of Probability really
commenced with Pascal and Fermat” (p. 20).
And yet, this work was never published by either
Pascal or Fermat, though both desired that it be
published.
It was Christian Huygens who
incorporated their work into a small tract
published in 1657, the first printed work on
games of chance (Walker, 1929). Huygens
learned the problem of points from one of
Carcavi=s friends (David, 1962). After Huygens
solved the problem and sent his solution to
Roberval, Carcavi sent Huygens the outlines of
the discussion of the problem between Fermat
and Pascal, and he later sent Fermat’s solution to
Huygens, which turned out to be the same as
Huygens’. Fermat posed even more difficult
problems to Huygens, which he solved and
incorporated into his tract (David, 1962).
According to David (1962), if one says that “the
real begetter of the calculus of probabilities is he
who first put it on a sound footing” (p. 110),
then one should look to Huygens, Lord of Zelem
and of Zuylichem, “the scientist who first put
forward in a systematic way the new
propositions..., who gave the rules and who first
made definitive the idea of mathematical
expectation”. For nearly fifty years, Huygen’s
work (in Latin) was the unique introduction to
the theory of probability (David, 1962).
Todhunter (1865) attributes a 1692 English
translation of Huygens’ tract to John Arbuthnot.
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Newton was familiar with Huygens’
writings (David, 1962). With the arrival of The
Great (bubonic) Plague (1664-65), Trinity
University was closed, and Newton retired to
Woolsthorpe for two years to invent calculus,
discover the universal law of gravitation, and
prove experimentally that white light is
composed of all colors. Newton’s Principia was
presented to the Royal Society in 1686 and
published in 1687 (printed at Edmund Halley's
expense), thirty years after Huygens published
the work of Pascal and Fermat. And in 1693,
Newton solved what was essentially de Mere=s
dice problem in response to a query by Samuel
Pepys, thus revealing what David (1962)
described as at least elementary knowledge of
probability theory.
Certain Knowledge
Probability theory has clearly long been
of interest to gamblers. As Bellhouse (1993)
noted, “familiarity with probability theory can
enhance the strategy of play.” Putting the
parentage of the theory aside, one must wonder,
given that Pascal and Fermat’s theory
culminated well over one hundred years of work
on probability, why the methods of probability
were not beginning to be incorporated into the
scientific pursuit of knowledge. David (1962)
opined, “At a time when it was still possible for
an able mathematician to take all knowledge for
his province, moreover when dicing, and
gambling with annuities, were practiced as
assiduously in England as anywhere else, it is
indeed strange that not only Newton but nearly
the whole of the English school showed no
interest in them” (p. 124-125).
David (1962) suggested that the
introduction of probability into science did not
come before the Renaissance “because the
philosophic development which opened so many
doors for the human intellect engendered a habit
of mind which made impossible the construction
of theoretical hypotheses from empirical data”
(p. 26). One or another form of Aristotelianism
was dominant at the beginning of the
seventeenth century (Garber, 1995). And yet,
even late into the Renaissance, during a period
in which Newton seemed to have obtained
hypotheses from data (despite his hypotheses

non fingo claim to the contrary), probability had
yet to enter the scientific arena.
One possible reason for this late entry of
probability into scientific method is that in the
middle of the seventeenth century, and through
the middle of the nineteenth century, knowledge
was defined as certified true belief. Indeed, even
Pascal claimed that he was not satisfied with the
probable, seeking instead the sure (Watkins,
1978). At the heart of this epistemological view,
according to Suppe (1977), was the argument
that S knows that P if and only if (a) P is true,
(b) S believes that P, and (c) S has adequate
evidence for believing that P. From the late
sixteenth through the early twentieth centuries,
natural philosophers were preoccupied by
systematic methods for discovering knowledge
(Mulaik, 1987). In this regard, the justification
clause (c) was satisfied only by finding a
demonstrably incorrigible base knowledge
consisting either of the intuitionist Descartes' a
priori clear and distinct ideas or by the sense
data of inductivists such as Bacon and Gassendi.
Greek philosophers recognized that the
senses can deceive us. For example, atomists
such as Democritus believed the world to be
made from tiny entities known as atoms whose
action on the senses cause us to experience smell
and heat, for example. Yet, as the atoms have no
smell or heat, the world of appearance is illusory
(Mulaik, 1987). For Descartes, whom Peirce
called “the father of modern philosophy”
(Peirce, 1868), the broadest aspects of nature are
understood by deduction from incorrigible first
principles, which are grounded in pure reason
(Salmon, 1966).
So committed to certainty was Descartes
that in his Discourse on Method of 1637 he
claimed as false all that was only probable.
According to Cartesianism, the world is full of
an infinitely divisible matter, reason dominates,
and philosophy is based on his own clear and
distinct perceptions (Garber, 1995). For
example, as Descartes wrote in his Meditations
(1642), “Now it is manifest by the natural light
that there must at least be as much reality in the
efficient and total cause as in its effect. For,
pray, whence can the effect derive its reality, if
not from its cause?” Salmon wonders how the
intuitionist Descartes, a man who could not be
certain that 2+2=4 or that he had hands unless he
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could prove that God is not a deceiver, found it
impossible to conceive of the falsity of the
foregoing principle.
Descartes prepared his Meditations in
Holland in 1640. Huygens transported it in
manuscript form to Mersenne, who solicited
responses from “learned men who would take
the trouble to scrutinize them” (Descartes, cited
in Joy, 1995, p. 431). Among those who
contributed were Hobbes, Gassendi, and
Mersenne, himself. According to Agassi (1975),
Gassendi asked why one would deduce “I think,
therefore I am?” Why not “I walk, therefore I
am?” Descartes understood the point and agreed
that if one walked, one necessarily existed. But
he could not be sure that he walked; he could be
sure that he thought, and that is why he preferred
his “Cogito”. He didn’t doubt the validity of
Gassendi’s inference, he only doubted the truth
of the premise that he walked. (Agassi
misattributed this Fifth Objection to Hobbes,
who actually wrote the Third.)
Gassendi was an empiricist. For him,
experience dominates, and philosophy begins
with our sensations of a public world; this world
is made up of atoms and a void, and he
attempted to reconcile Epicurean atomism in a
way that was more congenial to the Church. In
rejecting Aristotelianism, he, like Descartes,
adopted the mechanist philosophy’s premise that
physical phenomena could be described fully in
terms of matter and motion. He also believed
that our senses can fool us, which caused him to
formulate a kind of moderate skepticism that
influenced Locke, Peirce, and others.
For other empiricists, like Bacon, the
justification of scientific theory is based on its
ability to explain experimental results. Until
Bacon, logic as described in Aristotle’s Organon
(Greek for “tool”) was deductive. What was
needed was a method that abandoned
Aristotelianism’s approach that began with
hypotheses and deduced truths from them
(Mulaik, 1987). Bacon introduced his inductive
logic in his Novum Organum (Latin for “New
Tool”) in 1620. According to Bacon's doctrine
(Lakatos, 1978), a discovery is scientific only if
it is guided by facts through a method of
induction “that would begin without hypotheses
or speculations, systematically interrogate
nature, and move to ever more general truths by
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means of an automatic procedure or algorithms”
(Mulaik, 1987, p. 273). The scientist starts by
clearing his mind of theory (bias), and nature
will then make itself known. For Bacon, science
is an experimental enterprise through which one
investigates
phenomena
in
controlled
circumstances. Bacon’s method of eliminative
induction includes the logical insight that
affirming instances do not provide evidence for
inductive generalizations, whereas negative
instances do provide disconfirming evidence
(Mulaik, 1987). Bacon, apocryphally, died of
pneumonia that developed while he was
investigating refrigeration by stuffing a chicken
with snow.
Although Bacon’s Novum Organum of
1620 preceded Descartes’ Discourse on Method
by seventeen years, Descartes’ philosophy was
dominant at the time of Newton’s Principia.
According to the justificationist standards of the
day, then, Newton’s theory was non-knowledge
(Lakatos, 1978). Newton’s theory was not
proved in the Cartesian sense, because it was not
derived from Cartesian metaphysics. Newton
instead proposed that propositions required only
an
empirical-experimental
and
not
a
rational-metaphysical proof (Lakatos, 1978).
Because of the extraordinary success of
Newton's theory, “for 200 years after Newton no
one could advocate the use of hypotheses
without an uneasy backward glance” (Medawar,
1974). This, despite inductivism having suffered
what should have been severe setbacks at the
hands of Locke, Hume and Kant.
Probable Knowledge
The beauty and power of Newton’s
mathematical approach to physics clearly had an
effect on John Arbuthnot, who wrote in 1692,
“There are very few things which we know;
which are not capable of being reduc’d to a
Mathematical Reasoning; and when they cannot,
it’s a sign our Knowledge of them is very small
and confus’d” (Stigler, 1986, p. 1). Arbuthnot
implemented a binomial test in 1710 to examine
“the constant regularity observ’d in the births of
both sexes,” (Stigler, 1986, p. 225), and he is
often credited with publishing the first statistical
test. Fisher, however, attributed the first
published significance test to de Moivre in 1718,
and Barnard stipulated that the first published
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test was due to Daniel Bernoulli in 1734
(Bennett, 1990, p. 23-26). Regardless of which
test is deemed to have been the first, it is clear
that the eighteenth century held promise for
great discoveries in probability and statistics.
Some of the early discoveries in probability and
statistics were important to philosophers, as
well. Jacob Bernoulli developed the theory of
permutations and combinations and contributed
the weak law of large numbers, the theorem that
with an increasing number of observations, the
probability increases that an estimator will lie
within any specified distance of the true value.
According to Stigler (1986), at least five
Bernoullis worked on probability, writing “So
large is the set of Bernoullis that chance alone
may have made it inevitable that a Bernoulli
should be designated father of the quantification
of uncertainty” (Stigler, 1986, p. 63). Jacob
Bernoulli and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz are
known to have composed twenty-one letters to
one another, although one may not have been
sent (Sylla, 1998). Leibniz may have first
learned of Jacob’s work in probability from
Jacob’s brother, Johann, with whom Jacob was
not speaking. In a letter written in 1697, Leibniz
spoke of the “need for establishing on firm
foundations an art of measuring degrees of
proofs” (Sylla, 1998, p.48). And after the
publication in 1713 of Jacob Bernoulli’s Ars
Conjectandi,
accomplished
eight
years
posthumously by his nephew Nicholas because
of the rift between brothers, Leibniz noted that
the probabilities of obtaining an 11 and a 12 in
rolling two dice are equal.
John Locke is considered to be the
father of British empiricism, and he is perhaps
the first major philosopher to discuss probable
knowledge as a somewhat tenable, “second-rate
way of becoming cognitively aware of the nature
of the world” (Owen, 1993, p. 38). For Locke,
probable knowledge is faith or opinion. Owen
noted that Locke and other non-Cartesians stood
at a junction between the old and new ways of
looking at the world. Locke’s account
“recognizes the limitations of knowledge, rather
traditionally conceived, but looks ahead in
allowing its rational supplementation by
probable conjectures” (Owen, 1993, p. 39).
In his 1690 An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, Locke sought to support

Bacon’s empiricism by arguing that knowledge
can not have a component based on innate ideas.
He argued that if knowledge is not received
through the senses, then the mind at birth must
have some kind of intellectual ability, at least in
applying the concepts of logic (Clark, 1957).
Instead, he felt that a person enters the world
with a mind that is a blank slate. There are only
two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection.
For Locke, complex ideas are formed out of the
simple ones entering the mind through the
mental activities of compounding, abstracting,
and relating. By a method of analysis, Locke
was able to trace back from complex ideas to the
simple ones out of which they arose, but he
could not find the simple idea from which the
concept of substance came (Mulaik, 1987).
Because of this, and because he argued that the
certain qualities of objects, such as color and
odor, exist only in the mind and are not
representative of reality, we can not be certain
that any of our ideas are representative of reality.
The case for the demise of inductivism
was made well and irremediably in David
Hume=s Enquiry concerning the human
understanding of 1748. Hume’s objections to
induction can be variously phrased. According
to Harris (1992), Hume concluded that it is
impossible to justify epistemologically that
unobserved cases will resemble observed cases
in some crucial respect. Because of this, neither
certain nor probable knowledge can be justified.
Reichenbach (1951) discussed two
theses put forward by Hume. In the first thesis,
Hume makes clear the nonanalytic nature of
induction by pointing out that we can very well
imagine the contrary of the inductive conclusion.
The possibility of a false conclusion in
combination with a true premise proves that the
inductive inference does not carry a logical
necessity with it. Hume's second thesis is that
induction cannot be justified by reference to
experience--the inference with which we want to
justify induction is itself an inductive inference
(we believe in induction because induction has
so far been successful), and so we are caught in
circularity. Russell (1945, p. 672) stated Hume’s
conclusion as, “We cannot help believing, but no
belief can be grounded in reason.” Of Hume’s
conclusion, Russell (1945) exclaimed, “It is
therefore important to discover whether there is
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any answer to Hume within the framework of a
philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If
not, there is no intellectual difference between
sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes
that he is a poached egg is to be condemned
solely on the ground that he is in a minority” (p.
673). It would seem that as of 1748, unless
arguments could be mounted against Hume’s
attack, inductivism was dead. Yet, it lived on,
because of the success of Newton's theory.
Expanding on the work of Jacob and
Nicholas Bernoulli, De Moivre published the
first appearance of the normal curve in 1733
(Stigler, 1986). And in 1763, Bayes’ Theorem
was published posthumously by Richard Price,
who presented it to the Royal Society. Fisher
(1956) thought Bayes was reluctant to publish
his work because Bayes felt that his postulating
a uniform prior distribution might be considered
disputable. Price, according to Gillies (1993),
was strongly influenced by Hume’s criticisms of
induction and thought that Bayes’ Theorem
could be used to resolve the problems raised by
Hume by making generalizations probable,
rather than certain (this despite Hume’s
injunction against such a possibility).
Synthetic a priori Knowledge
The first major intuitionist response to
Hume's empiricist attack was due to Kant, who
wrote Critique of pure reason in 1781,
according to Reichenbach (1951), “with the
intention of saving scientific knowledge from
the annihilating consequences of Hume’s
criticism.” Kant, who in his preface to the
Critique compared his work to that of
Copernicus, made clear two distinctions among
types of propositions. First, he distinguished
between analytic propositions (true virtually by
definition, such as the statement “All bachelors
are unmarried”) and synthetic propositions
(those that inform us about a fact, such as
observations, and add to our knowledge).
Second, he distinguished between a priori
propositions, those which have a basis other than
experience, and a posteriori (or empirical)
propositions, needing observational evidence to
determine their truth. He posited that objects
conform to the conditions set forth by the mind,
that whereas the senses provide the subject
matter, the mind imposes the form of thought.

208

Rather than the mind being a Baconian blank
slate, Kant specified what he called the
categories of thought as the a priori equipment
for thinking. He felt that by showing that the
axioms of Euclidean geometry were synthetic
and yet known a priori, he could establish the
incorrigible basis that justified Suppe’s clause
(c) mentioned earlier. It would seem, then, that
at this point, intuitionism held the upper hand,
due to Hume’s crushing blow against
inductivism and to Kant’s intuitionist argument
that Euclidean geometry was synthetic and yet
known a priori.
The nineteenth century saw major
upheavals in science and philosophy. As
described by Reichenbach (1951), “Ever since
the death of Kant in 1804 science has gone
through a development, gradual at first and
rapidly increasing in tempo, in which it
abandoned all absolute truths and preconceived
ideas.” Lagrange introduced the method of least
squares in 1805, and in 1809 Gauss addressed
the same problem but couched it in probabilistic
terms (he also claimed priority for the method of
least squares, claiming he had used it since 1795
- Stigler, 1986).
Laplace contributed the central limit
theorem in 1810, inverse probability and the
principle of insufficient reason in 1812. His
definition of probability was as a state of mind
(Fisher, 1956; Epstein, 1977), whereas Bayes
seems to have used a frequentist definition
(Fisher, 1956). The definition of probability as
the limit of a frequency was due to Poisson in
1837. According to Epstein (1977), the theory of
probability is more indebted to Laplace than to
any other mathematician; indeed, Stigler (1986,
p. 122) claims that Laplace’s work brought
about “a truly Copernican revolution in
statistical
concept.”
The
Gauss-Laplace
synthesis brought together two lines - the
combination of observations and the use of
probability to make inferences - into a coherent
whole that was widely disseminated through the
middle of the century (Stigler, 1986).
But Gauss, along with Bolyai and
Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, called the
Copernicus
of
geometry
by
English
mathematician William Clifford (Bell, 1937),
made a discovery that had far greater
philosophical import - the discovery of
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non-Euclidean
geometry.
Lobachevsky’s
publication appeared in 1829-30 and Bolyai’s in
1832. Gauss claimed to have obtained similar
results earlier but did not publish because,
according to Gillies (1993, p. 80), “he was
‘afraid of the clamour of the Boeotians.’ Boeotia
was a region of ancient Greece whose
inhabitants were considered by the Athenians to
be stupid and uncultured” (p. 80). The arrival of
non-Euclidean geometry showed that Kant’s
implication that humans could never conceive of
non-Euclidean geometries was untenable.
Despite this, Kant’s impact was strong and
lasting.
Descriptive Knowledge
Burtt (1924) saw elements of positivism
in Galileo's work, and Burtt cited Brewster’s
claim that Newton was the first great positivist.
The founder of positivism in its 19th century
form was Auguste Comte. Comte's Cours de
philosophie Positive was completed in 1842.
Comte is also known as the founder of
sociology. Positivism was Comte’s response to
the upheavals in society and to Laplace’s
“scientifically
reasoned
deterministic
interpretation of the universe” (Epstein, 1977,
p.7). It was Comte’s hope that science could be
turned into a religion, “in which the great
philosophers and scientists took the place of the
Christian saints, and an organized devotion to
the cause of humanity was substituted for the
worship of God” (Fuller, 1938, p. 384).
According to Comte, there are three stages in the
history of thought: 1) a theological stage,
explaining the universe in terms of the purposes
of deities; 2) a metaphysical stage, explaining in
terms of abstract principles which are
personified; and 3) a scientific stage, in which
uniformities in nature are described without
reading any evidence of purpose or design or
consciousness into them. The meaning of terms
are referred to what is found in experience.
Positivists eschew metaphysics and
refrain from explanation in physics. Science
organizes knowledge using laws that are merely
descriptions, approximate at that, of the patterns
in which phenomena occur, and science gives us
the power of prediction. Bradley (1971)
paraphrased Martineau in saying it is strange

that something so negative should be called
positivism.
Fortunately, although an actual Religion
of Positivism was started, with priests, rituals,
and baptisms, most of Comte’s excesses in this
direction were ignored. Comte’s positivist heir
was physicist Ernst Mach, who was ecumenical
in his influences, including Hume, Kant, and
Darwin (Cohen, 1970, p. 127). According to
Cohen (1970), Mach “apparently succeeded in
combining a Kantian appreciation of the active,
even constitutive, role of the mind in generating
science with a scientific, which is to say,
empirical-biological, theory of the origins and
functions of the mental life” (p. 156). For Mach,
“not knowledge attained, but the method of
attaining it, could be certified” (Cohen, 1970,
p.129).
Mach,
like
Comte,
was
an
instrumentalist and felt that laws were mere
descriptions of nature. Mach, however, did not
completely do away with theories (as opposed to
laws), as long as they were testable. Mach’s
positivism differs from Comte's in that nothing
was “more foreign to Mach than the tendency
towards absolutism which finally disfigured both
the philosophical and the human image of
Comte” (von Mises, 1970, p. 266). Even by the
turn of the twentieth century, physicists such as
Plank and Einstein, although influenced greatly
by Mach early on, began to turn against
positivism.
Conjectural Knowledge
William Whewell, who coined the word
‘scientist’ (as well as ‘anode’ and ‘cathode’ for
Faraday and the words ‘physicist’, ‘eocene’,
‘miocene’, and ‘pliocene’ - Medawar, 1974)
upon the request of the poet Samuel Taylor
Coleridge in 1833, tried to reformulate the
problems of the philosophy of science in a
Kantian way (Wettersten, 1993), while not
relying on Kant’s fixed a priori categories. He
attempted to “explain the facts of the growth and
stability of science without appeal to induction,
which he saw to be useless” (Wettersten, 1993,
p. 482). In his Novum Organum Renovatum of
1858, Whewell considered induction to be “the
representation of facts with principles”
(Wettersten, 1993, p. 497), a notion that will be
seen in the pragmatacist philosophy of Charles
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Sanders Peirce, and not the Baconian induction
from facts to generalizations. He showed that
neither empiricism nor intuitionism, including
Kant=s, could account for the growth of scientific
knowledge; instead, both experience and
intuition were needed. He gave importance to
independent tests and to new predictions, and he
claimed that science needs guesses (Medawar,
1974 noted that Whewell also used the phrase
‘felicitous strokes of inventive talent’ when a
more formal phrase than ‘happy guesses’ was
required.) As Medawar (1974, p. 281) explained,
“To say that Einstein formulated a theory of
relativity by guesswork is on all fours with
saying that Wordsworth wrote rhymes and
Mozart tuneful music. It is cheeky where
something grave is called for to explain how
scientists discover true principles.” According to
Wettersten (1993, p. 506), Whewell’s theory
makes clear that Aeven if we start with poor
guesses and treat them critically we can come to
the truth: there are many paths to the truth but
only one goal’. We see then that Whewell’s
approach is essentially deductivist and that the
process consists above all in criticism. In this,
Whewell is a direct predecessor to Karl Popper’s
philosophy of conjectures and refutations
(Wettersten, 1992).
According to Reichenbach (1951), “the
turning point in the history of logic was the
middle of the nineteenth century, when
mathematicians like Boole and de Morgan
undertook to set forth the principles of logic in a
symbolic language.” Peirce, a mathematician
and logician by training, carried on this work. It
was not until Boole, DeMorgan, and Peirce
mathematically overhauled traditional formal
logic that the logic of probability was put on a
more scientifically useful basis (Wiener, 1972).
That Peirce was a frequentist could have been
due to Boole’s strong criticism in 1854 of the
postulate of which Bayes was so chary. Like
Whewell, Peirce was heavily influenced by
Kant. He claimed that he read Kant=s Critique of
Pure Reason two hours per day for three years,
and he named his philosophy ‘pragmatism’ in
honor of Kant, whom he called The Philosopher.
He did not use the term practicalism, because in
Kant pragmatism and practicalism are virtually
polar opposites (Buchler, 1939).
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Pragmatic
means
empirical
or
experimental, whereas Kant’s notion of practical
laws are given purely a priori. Indeed, so often
were these terms misunderstood that Peirce
threatened to call his philosophy pragmaticism, a
term he felt was so ugly that it wouldn’t be
kidnapped.
According to Wiener (1972), the great
difference between the American pragmatists
and Kant is their denial that over and above
contingent pragmatic belief are the purely
rational, necessary, and absolute ideas of Kant's
transcendental philosophy. The purpose of
inquiry, wrote Peirce, is to enable us to pass
from a state of doubt to a state of belief. Despite
his high regard for Kant, Peirce’s philosophy
differed from that of Kant. For example,
whereas Kant considered mathematics to be
synthetic and yet true a priori, Peirce held that
mathematics and logic are not synthetic
(Buchler, 1939).
He also provided his own version of
Kant’s categories, writing of them that in
making their character unchangeable, Kant was
hostile to the spirit of empiricism. Because of
the constant nature of Kant’s categories, Kant’s
epistemology formed a closed system. But
Peirce, having the benefit of Darwin’s Origin of
Species of 1859, provides an adaptive
mechanism behind his categories. Peirce
attempted to convert the Darwinian ideas of
chance variation and natural selection into the
idea of an evolution of the mind by means of a
logical competition among thoughts, which
eliminates ideas not fit to stand for the truth
fated to be discovered by those who investigate.
It was the nonevolutionary character of the old
forms of a static empiricism and a rigid a priori
intuitionism that engaged the pragmatists.
Peirce was a fallibilist, extending the
views of Gassendi and Locke in a most thorough
way. “I will not,” he wrote, “admit that we know
anything with absolute certainty. It is possible
that twice two is not four” (Peirce, 1958, p. 64).
Although he felt that the notion of certain
knowledge is absurd for a variety of reasons,
there were two main reasons underpinning his
fallibilism. First, all claims to knowledge are
criticizable and only held conditionally, for there
is no ultimate inductivist or empiricist basis that
can stop the respective infinite regress in the
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justification of the claims. And second, he felt
that no theory was true, able to satisfy all
features of the facts. In terms of Newton=s law of
gravity, he pointed out that if, instead of inverse
square attraction, the exponent of the distance
between bodies was 2.000001, there would only
be a minor consequence observable in the orbits
of the planets, resulting in only slight
discrepancies in estimated planet masses (Peirce,
1958).
Peirce (1878) classified all inference as
either deductive (or analytic) or synthetic, which
he subdivided into induction and hypothesis.
(One difficulty encountered in reading Peirce
results
from
his
using
‘hypothesis’,
‘retroduction’, and ‘abduction’ for the same
synthetic inference. In addition, Peirce
delineated several types of induction.)
Deduction is a syllogism in which the truth of a
rule and a case is transmitted to the result, and
conversely from the falsity of the conclusion, the
falsity of the premise follows. In induction, we
infer from a number of cases that the same thing
is true of a whole class. Peirce showed that an
induction is the inverse of a deductive syllogism,
so that from the case and the result, the rule is
inferred. As an example (Peirce, 1878), from the
deduction:
Rule: All the beans in the bag were
white.
Case: These beans were in the bag.
Result: These beans are white.
we can obtain the induction:
Case:

These beans were in the bag.

Result: These beans are white.
Rule:

All the beans in the bag were

white.
Hypothesis infers the case from the rule and the
result:
Rule:
are white.

All the beans from this bag

Result: These beans are white.
Case: These beans are from this bag.
Peirce described the scientific method in
terms of these three modes of inference in the
following way (Peirce, 1958):
Accepting the conclusion that an
explanation is needed when facts
contrary to what we should expect
emerge, it follows that the explanation
must be such a proposition as would
lead to the prediction of the observed
facts
A hypothesis then, has to be adopted,
which is likely in itself, and renders
the facts likely. This step of adopting a
hypothesis as being suggested by the
facts, is what I call abduction.
[T]he first thing that will be done, as
soon as a hypothesis has been adopted,
will be to trace out its necessary and
probable experiential consequences.
This step is deduction. (p. 122).
An abduction for Peirce is an explanation.
The third step in the process involves
induction (Peirce, 1958):
Having...drawn from a hypothesis
predictions...we proceed to test the
hypothesis by making the experiments
and comparing those predictions with
the actual results of the experiment.
This sort of inference it is, from
experiments testing predictions based
on a hypothesis, that is alone properly
entitled to be called induction.
Induction...is not justified by any
relation between the facts stated in the
premisses and the fact stated in the
conclusion...But the justification of its
conclusion is that that conclusion is
reached by a method which, steadily
persisted in, must lead to true
knowledge in the long run. (p. 124125)
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Peirce distinguished two major types of
valid induction (there is actually a third type that
Peirce called the Pooh-pooh argument, but
enough said). The first, quantitative induction,
involves the ascertainment of a ratio in the
population from samples. Through this type if
induction, we can attain moral certainty of the
population value, by which Peirce means a
probability of 1 based on Bernoulli’s results
concerning the probability that the sample value
lies within certain limits of the population value.
“Of course,” he wrote, “there is a difference
between probability 1 and absolute certainty”
(Peirce, 1958, p. 131). The second type of
induction Peirce called qualitative induction,
from which the most that can be said is that
there is no reason yet for giving up the
hypothesis. Of this second type, Peirce (1958)
wrote, “the only justification for this would be
that it is the result of a method that persisted in
must eventually correct any error that it leads us
into” (p. 134).
Peirce claimed for induction a
trustworthiness because of the manner of
proceeding (Buchler, 1939). The concept of a
probable argument referred to a class of
arguments, and an induction belongs to the class
of all inductions. Saying an induction was
probable meant that the majority of inductions
were successful. “[T]hat real and sensible
difference between one degree of probability
and another...is that in the frequent employment
of two different modes of inference, one will
carry truth with it oftener than the other” (Peirce,
1878).
Neither qualitative nor quantitative
induction and the associated probabilities of
success involves the probability that a
generalization itself is true. According to
Buchler (1939), “After 1883 Peirce does not
even regard induction as ‘probable’...but rather
as not probable at all” (p. 251). Peirce said that
talking about the probability of a law was
nonsense, as if universes were as plentiful as
blackberries, and we could pick one. This later
view reflects Peirce’s distinction between two
types of probability, the empirical probability
associated with ratios or with the class of
inductions
and
what
Peirce
called
conceptualistic probability that is not strictly a
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probability, but is instead only a sense of
probability (Buchler, 1939).
As with Whewell, Peirce emphasized
that potential explanatory hypotheses are
formulated as guesses. For Peirce, as with Mach,
the force of scientific reason lies in its methods.
“[T]he method of methods, is the true and
worthy idea of the science” (Peirce, 1958, p. 44).
Science is rational, according to Peirce (1958, p.
49), where “...‘rational’ means essentially selfcriticizing, self-controlling and self-controlled,
and therefore open to incessant question.” And
rather than leading to the probability that the
inductive inference itself is true, the ability to
draw valid conclusions lies with the probability
of correctness of its inductive method, “the
relative frequency with which this class of
inferences is found to yield true conclusions”
(Buchler, 1939, p. 233).
Unprovable and Improbable Knowledge
By the end of the nineteenth century, the
philosophical focus was on American
Pragmatism and Machian positivism. Both
Galton
and
Pearson
were
Machian
instrumentalists, which would at least partly
explain Pearson’s emphasis on fitting data to his
own system of curves. The continuation of
Mach’s doctrines fell to the logical empiricists.
The response of Russell and the Vienna Circle
philosophers was to search for an empirical basis
and an inductive logic. Realizing that justifying
an inductive principle on the basis of
observation would lead to an infinite regress - to
justify it would require inductive inferences Russell advocated accepting the principle of
induction on the ground of its intrinsic evidence
(Gillies, 1993), that is, on an a priori basis. But
even if we accepted a priorism as a justification
of an inductive principle, the positivists' search
for an empirical basis was doomed to failure, as
shown by Duhem, who advanced two theses
against inductivism. One of these, afterwards to
become known as the Duhem-Quine thesis, will
be discussed later.
The other thesis shows that all
observations are theory-laden. According to
Agassi (1983), the claim that empirical evidence
has a theoretical bias was recognized by Bacon
and Galileo; if one has a theory, it biases
perception. This led to Bacon’s request that
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scientists first make observations with no theory
in mind. Galileo realized, of course, that this
would result in “just a heap of observations”
(Agassi, 1983, p. 10), and he was convinced that
geometry, based on a priori intuitions, must
precede facts. This led to Kant’s argument
against empiricism, and Whewell, influenced by
Kant, deduced that all data are interpreted, either
on the basis of theory or of a priori intuitions.
Therefore, trying to prove a theory inductively
ultimately requires proving a theory from a
theory, which is impossible. All one could
conclude on this basis is that the theories
involved
are
consistent.
Thus,
the
theory-ladenness of observations meant that
theories could no longer be hoped to be proved
from an incorrigible basis.
It was still felt, however, that although
theories may not be provable, they still could be
disproved, or falsified, a view that flies in the
face of the Duhem’s second thesis, which states
that an experiment can never condemn an
isolated hypothesis but only a whole theoretical
group. Underpinning this thesis is the realization
that no theory can specify any observable
consequences. Rather, it requires the conjunction
of the theory, initial conditions, and auxiliary
hypotheses. Thus, there can not be such a thing
as a crucial experiment, on the basis of which a
theory is falsified and dropped, because an
observation contrary to prediction can only
condemn the collective and not any individual
part. Quine (1951) concluded that any statement
can be held to be true, if we make enough
adjustments elsewhere in the system. Thus, not
only did the theory-ladenness of observations
make theories unprovable, the Duhem-Quine
thesis makes them undisprovable. So positivists
had to fall back on the hope that theories could
at least be shown to be probable.
Neyman and Pearson (1933) and Fisher
(1935) approached these issues from different
perspectives, and certainly different from the
probabilist approach of Jeffreys (1939). For
probabilists, theories have different degrees of
probability (Lakatos, 1978). Scientific honesty
then consists in uttering only highly probable
theories, or the probability in light of the
evidence. But Ritchie (1926) showed that the
probability of any inductive generalization is
zero, and Lakatos (1978) points out that in the

early 1940’s, Carnap found that the degree of
confirmation of all genuinely universal
propositions was zero. So not only can no theory
be proved or disproved with certainty, but
theories are also equally improbable. This, then,
was finally the end of positivism.
Criticism and Knowledge
Popper, in his Logic der Forshung in
1934 (Popper, 1959), attempted to address the
issues that have been raised, especially Hume’s
skepticism,
the
theory-ladenness
of
observations, and the inability to condemn a
hypothesis in isolation. In his solution, we can
see much of what was good in Hume, Kant,
Mach, and especially Whewell and Peirce.
Popper’s view of knowledge is fallibilist, as was
Peirce’s, and for him method is fallible as well,
as distinguished from Mach’s view that method
was certain. Indeed, Peirce’s overall view of the
inductive process is virtually indistinguishable
from the conjecture-and-refutation model
advocated by Popper (Wiener, 1972). Popper
(1962) claimed that his method of conjectures
and refutations had its origins in the writings of
Kant. Popper never questioned Hume’s
indictment of induction; instead, he insisted
there was no problem. Instead of an inductive
principle, Popper advanced “the theory of the
deductive method of testing, or as the view that
a hypothesis can only be empirically tested--and
only after it has been advanced” (Popper, 1959,
p. 30).
Musgrave (1993) described Popper’s
solution to the problem of induction in the
following way. Popper, he said, rejected the
assumption that an ampliative hypothesis is
reasonable if, and only if, it is justified by the
evidence, if, and only if, the evidence shows it to
be true or probably true. In this, it is not clear
whether justifying beliefs refers to justifying the
things we believe or providing a warrant for our
believing those things. According to the classical
argument, we are justified in believing
something if, and only if, we can show it to be
true or at least show it to be more likely true
than not. Popper rejected this assumption,
allowing him to endorse Hume’s inductive
skepticism while rejecting his irrationalism. To
get from the skeptical thesis to the irrationalist
thesis you also must assume that a belief is
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reasonable if and only if it is justified. Popper
rejected this also.
In Musgrave’s (1993) view, Popper
affirmed that some evidence-transcending
beliefs are reasonable. The central claim of
Popper’s approach, said Musgrave (1993), is
that an evidence-transcending belief is
reasonable if, and only if, it has withstood
criticism, including, where appropriate, attempts
to refute it by appeal to evidence. When a
prediction is falsified we will say that what we
predicted was wrong, not that it was
unreasonable to have predicted it. For any
reasonable theory of reasonable belief,
according to Musgrave (1993), must make room
for reasonable beliefs in untruths. In short,
Hume’s criticism of induction applied to the
search for a warrant for our beliefs, whereas in
Musgrave=s view, it does not apply to obtaining
a warrant for our act of believing.
By contrast, according to the pancritical
rationalism of Bartley (1984) and the
comprehensively critical rationalism of Miller
(2002), reflecting and extending the philosophy
of Peirce and Popper, “neither beliefs nor acts of
belief, nor decisions, nor even preferences, are
reasonable or rational except in the sense that
they are reached by procedures or methods that
are reasonable or rational...Still less are beliefs,
or decisions, or preferences ever justified”
(Miller, 2002, p. 81). According to Miller
(1982), the major difference between Popper’s
falsificationism
and
the
justificationist
philosophy of others is methodological, not
epistemological.
Virtually all modern philosophers of
science agree that certain knowledge can not be
attained. Popper was the first to say outright that
the attempt to attain certainty should not even be
made. Miller (1982) pointed out that for
justificationists, a hypothesis has to be
confirmed, perhaps inductively, before it is
admitted to science, and if it fails the tests, or is
disconfirmed, or not confirmed at all, it is
excluded from science. For Descartes, ideas that
can not be justified by being reduced to clear
and distinct ideas should be rejected, and
anything that is accepted must be justified in this
way. For Hume, any idea that can be justified by
being derived from experience, the empiricist=s
only source of knowledge, should be accepted,
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and any idea that can not should be rejected
(Bartley, 1984).
For Popper, as with Peirce, a hypothesis
is tested only after it is admitted by being
conjectured. There is a policy of “open
admission”, restricted only by the requirement
that no hypothesis be admitted without there
being some way to test it (Miller, 1982, p. 22). If
the hypothesis passes a test, nothing happens,
whereas if it fails a test, it is expelled. Because
of the open admission policy, “it is of the
greatest importance that the expulsion
procedures should be brought into play at every
possible opportunity...If we are seriously
searching for the truth, we should submit any
hypothesis proposed to the most searching
barrage of criticism, in the hope that if it is false
it will reveal itself as false” (Miller, 1982, p.23).
Criticism
One objection that could be raised
regarding the critical rationalist methodology
concerns the use of logic in a rational approach
to science. Surely, this line of thinking would
go, the principles of logic must be assumed to be
true on an a priori basis. Are we not committed
to an un-revisable logic, because logic itself can
not be used to criticize logic? It is true that
“critical argument...cannot be carried on without
some system of logic. You cannot in this sense
abandon logic and remain a rationalist” (Miller,
1994, p. 91). But the system of logic one uses
can be criticized if the logical rules consistently
lead to errors. Miller (1994) gives the example
of a program written in FORTRAN that can be
used to test the correctness of an operating
system, even though the operating system is
presupposed. Miller (1994) noted that it is “logic
itself” (p. 91) that is supposedly assumed to be
beyond criticism by critical rationalism. Yet,
logic is involved in the critical argument in a
particular formulation, at a minimum usually
involving the principle of noncontradiction and
the law of excluded middle, which might be
right or wrong, and not in an unformulated way
as logic itself. And whatever the particular
formulation, it can certainly be criticized.
Does not the approach presuppose an
inductive principle, such as the uniformity of
nature or that the future will resemble the past,
at least as far as specifying that we expect that
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the laws we’ve discovered should work in the
future? As Miller (1982) pointed out, “In order
to provide genuinely interesting knowledge of
the world inductivism needs to assume that there
is some order and regularity in the world, whilst
falsificationism requires only that there is some
order and regularity in the worldBbut it does not
need to make any sort of assumption to this
effect” (p. 33). Miller went on to note that if
there were no regularity, falsificationism would
yield little, except the conjecture that there is no
regularity. Hypotheses propose order, but if
there is none, none will be found. They do not
presuppose it.
As regards the reliability of a theory, no
theory is reliable, in that Hume showed that
without an inductive principle such as that the
future will resemble the past, there is no logical
way to infer that the theory will work in the
future (or that it will fail). But if a theory is
conjectured and stands up to severe testing, then
it has not been discorroborated (a term used to
emphasize the tentative nature of falsifications),
and it may be tentatively classified as true; and
one can deduce from the conjecture that various
predictions will hold without relying on the
uniformity of nature. As Miller (1980) wrote,
“Whatever one calls them, Hume’s problem
simply does not arise for guesses” (p. 123). But,
the issue might be pursued, if theories are
unreliable, then why should any decisions be
based on them?
Again, it seems rational to base a
decision on a theory that has stood up to severe
testing instead of one that has failed a severe
test. As Miller (2002) pointed out, if one wants
to avoid bad outcomes tomorrow, he can cross
his fingers or he can try to be rational today.
This does not mean, of course, that we can not
hope that our favorite theories will continue to
stand up to severe criticism. Radnitzky (1982)
explained, “we have a subjective belief that the
regularities described by a highly corroborated
theory will also hold in the future. But this
subjective belief is not granted any
methodological significance” (p. 74).
Finally, the question arises as to how
one could base a rejection of theory on the basis
of experience if all basic statements are
tentative. In this regard, Popper (1985) pointed
to the well-known asymmetry between

corroboration and rejection, namely that no
matter how many confirmatory observations are
observed, a theory can never be proved, whereas
a single disconfirmatory observation can falsify
(tentatively) a theory. Thus, as regards the
observational basis, “No matter whether they are
true or whether they are false, a universal law
may not be derived from them. However if we
assume that they are true the universal law may
be falsified by them” (Popper, 1985, p. 185).
Here the basic statements are conjectured to be
true and are severely tested. “No falsification is
conclusive,” Miller (1982) wrote, “if only
because all test statements are themselves
fallible and open to dispute. But it would be
incorrect to conclude from this that no
hypothesis can be properly falsified... [T]hat a
falsification has not been done conclusively does
not mean that it has not been done correctly” (p.
24). The important thing about basic statements,
Miller (1982) pointed out, is that they should be
true. If there is doubt about a basic statement, it
is rational to test it. It is not enough simply to
doubt, because doubt is not the same thing as
criticism.
Gambling with Nature
The philosophical underpinnings of the
demand for severity in testing hypotheses has
been discussed and codified by Mayo (1996).
“What are needed,” she wrote (Mayo, 1996), are
arguments that H is correct, that experimental
outcomes will very frequently be in accordance
with what H predictsBthat H will very frequently
succeed...We
obtain
such
experimental
knowledge by making use of probabilitiesBnot
of hypotheses but probabilistic characteristics of
experimental testing methods (e.g., their
reliability or severity)” (p. 122).
Mayo (1996) explained, “The control of
error probabilities has fundamental uses in
learning contexts. The link between controlling
error probabilities and experimental learning
comes by way of the link between error
probabilities and severity. The ability to provide
methods whose actual error probabilities will be
close to those specified by a formal statistical
model, I believe, is the key to achieving
experimental knowledge” (p. 411).
Mayo seemed to concur with Peirce in
this, including Peirce’s focus on verification.
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Yet, as we have seen, inductive support is not
possible. Miller (1982) described the task of
empirical science as separating as best it can true
statements about the world from false ones, and
to retain the true ones. The mission, of course, is
to classify, and not certify, truths. Scientific
conjectures are “hopelessly fallible, hopelessly
improbable, hopelessly unlikely to be true”
(Miller, 1982, p. 20). And yet, the conjectural
nature of our hypotheses makes them ready to be
shown to be wrong. In so doing, we must strictly
control the rate at which we make errors in order
to ensure a desired level of severity. This
imposition of severe testing is a methodological
one (Miller, 1982), and it is consistent with both
Peirce’s philosophical views and with Neyman’s
(1957) philosophy of inductive behavior.
Neyman (1957) wrote that the
concluding phase of scientific research, often
labeled inductive reasoning, involves mental
processes that are very different from those
involved in proving a theorem. Instead of
inductive reasoning, which may be considered a
misnomer, Neyman preferred the phrase
inductive behavior. Neyman pointed out that
theories are models of natural phenomena, that
is (Neyman, 1957, p. 8)
A model is a set of invented
assumptions regarding invented entities such
that, if one treats these invented entities as
representations of appropriate elements of the
phenomena studied, the consequences of the
hypotheses constituting the model are expected
to agree with observations.
In describing the concluding phase,
which he pointed out was frequently described
as induction, he felt that the constituent
processes were of three types (Neyman, 1957, p.
10). First, the visualization of several possible
sets of hypotheses relevant to the phenomenon,
second deductions from these sets of hypotheses,
and third an “act of will or a decision to take a
particular action, perhaps to assume a particular
attitude towards the various sets of hypotheses.”
We need to specify in advance the desired
properties of our decision procedure and try to
determine the decision rule that has these
properties. Given that the hypothesized model is
adequate, probability calculations are used to
“tell us how frequently the given rule will
prescribe any of the actions contemplated”
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(Neyman, 1957, p. 18). The mental processes
involved in the third step, according to Neyman,
amount to taking a calculated risk.
Levi (1980) commented on the
connection between Peirce’s approach to
induction and the Neyman and Pearson theory of
hypothesis testing: “Peirce’s inductions are
inferences according to rules specified in
advance of drawing the inferences where the
properties of the rules which make the
inferences good ones concern the probability of
success in using the rules. These are features of
the rules which followers of the NeymanPearson approach to confidence interval
estimation would insist on” (p. 138). Peirce’s
call for predesignation is echoed in Pearson’s
(1936) insight that “to base the choice of the test
of a statistical hypothesis upon an inspection of
the observations is a dangerous practice; a study
of the configuration of a sample is almost certain
to reveal some feature, or features, which are
exceptional if the hypothesis is true” (p. 317).
Mayo (1993), in drawing out the common
philosophical underpinnings of the Peirce and
the Neyman-Pearson methodologies, noted that
Birnbaum and Armitage showed that violating
predesignation permits tests which can be wrong
with extremely high probability.
It may be illustrative to view the
appropriate use of statistical methods in the
course of taking Neyman’s calculated risk as a
system to use, similar say to a system for
playing blackjack, while “gambling with truth”
(Levi, 1967) in what Milnor (1954) called
“games against nature.” In a sense, probability
theory is returned to its roots. If the game
against nature is to be played, it seems only
rational to adopt a system that is known to yield
a particular advantageous probability of
winning.
In blackjack, even the best systems yield
an overall probability of winning of 0.51 or so
(Epstein, 1977), so a player must follow a
system rigorously or the chances of winning will
be reduced, if not reversed. The system is not
totally rigid, in that each decision is based on the
available information at the time the decision is
to be made, but this adaptive decision-making
scheme is figured into the overall winning
probability, which is known in advance. The
player must be steeled against following
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intuition or building up superstitions. If a high
card is needed, and if the cards so far observed
indicate that there is a sufficient proportion of
high cards left in the deck to require the player
to request a card, the decision should not be
influenced by having seen the previous three
players receive high cards; nor by the memory
that taking a card in a previous similar
circumstance led to a losing hand; nor by the
feeling that the queen of diamonds is an unlucky
card.
Analogously, if prior theoretical or
empirical information led on the basis of
superior power in a three-group design to the
choice of Fisher’s (1935) Least Significant
Difference (LSD) method of planned
comparisons, then that must be the procedure
that is carried out. There will be losing hands,
experiments in which the Holm procedure would
have found significant results that LSD missed.
But unless the background information that led
to the choice of LSD is substantially changed,
the researcher must be comforted by the
knowledge that the gambling system that is
being employed will in the long run yield errors
at the low prespecified rate. On the other hand, if
the researcher chooses between LSD and Holm,
say, only after the data are seen, the control of
error rates is lost. As Miller wrote (1994), “Of
course, we can be less zealous, and criticize
more mildly. That will not disqualify the
proposals that would survive harsher
criticism...But it will inevitably compromise the
rationality of the decision-making process” (p.
43).
Other well-known examples of the price
paid in violating predesignation involve the
choice of a one-tailed test (and direction) after
the results are known or the choice of a
significant covariate for use in an analysis of
covariance in the same data set, both of which
would increase the Type I error rate. Freedman
(1983) similarly found that screening for
potential predictors in regression analysis before
a final model is fit and tested results in inflated
Type I error rates (this result applies to the
previous example of covariate choice), and
Zimmerman (1996) showed that choosing
between Student=s t test and the Welch (1947)
test on the basis of a test of homogeneity of
variance results in a two-stage procedure whose

Type I error rates are inflated. Similar problems
would arise when the choice between analysis of
covariance and analysis of variance is made on
the basis of results of tests for baseline
differences, (This is especially peculiar when the
baseline test is performed even when random
assignment was used, because in that case the
only conclusion to draw is that the
randomization was not successful. Should we
redo the randomization until we like the results?)
or when the choice between the t test and a
particular form of nonparametric test is made on
the basis of the skewness and kurtosis of the
dependent variable in the current sample.
The reason that error rates are changed
as a result of any similar two-stage procedure is
that the first stage test incurs its own errors,
which are then compounded in the second stage.
Consider Zimmerman=s results. If the population
variances are equal and the other assumptions of
the t test hold, then Student=s t test is optimal in
holding its Type I error rate and yielding desired
power. But the error characteristics of the t test
are based on all possible samplings, some of
which will yield two samples with apparently
different variances. If, in this case, the
preliminary test commits a Type I error of its
own, the Welch test used at the second stage has
lower power than it should, and these cases are
also removed from the sampling distribution of
the t test. The t is left to operate only on samples
whose variances are too close. Conversely, if the
population variances are unequal, a Type II error
at the first stage results in the use of the t test
when it is inappropriate, yielding an inflation of
the Type I error rate of the method.
Mayo (1993) also pointed out that
Pearson, whom she said shied away from
Neyman’s notion of inductive behavior,
‘specifically denied that the tests are to be used
as automatic routines for testing claims” (p.
171). Indeed, in this regard, Neyman (1957)
criticized Fisher’s significance testing approach
of having an automatic character in apparently
always selecting a one per cent p-value as the
cutoff for significance, concluding, “There are
weighty arguments against this automatism. In
fact, it appears desirable to determine the level
of significance in accordance with quite a few
circumstances that vary from one particular
problem to the next” (p. 12). These would
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include a consideration of the severity of the
errors, both Type I and Type II. Rosnow and
Rosenthal (1989, p. 1277) may have been right
in this connection when they wrote, “Surely,
God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05”, but
once they have decided in advance of
experiment on a value that would not be too
displeasing to the statistical deity, they must
ensure that the methods they choose control the
error rate at this level.
Mayo
(1993)
observed
that
predesignation is only called for when violating
predesignation would conflict with the goal of
controlling the error probabilities. One example
of the use of changing error rates midexperiment that does not affect the overall
properties of the test of a theoretical hypothesis
is seen in the context of multiple comparisons. A
family is defined as the set of comparisons, the
significance of any one of which would lead to
the conclusion that the theory has been
discorroborated.
Any contrast whose significance does
not impinge on the truth of the theory under test
is not part of the family. Darlington’s (1990)
notion of conceptual dependence, to be
distinguished from statistical dependence,
among contrasts that constitute a family may be
helpful in deciding whether or not contrasts
belong to a family. Because methodology must
be committed to controlling the rate at which the
theory is falsely rejected, all legitimate multiple
comparison procedures do so successfully,
usually through the use of the Dunn-Bonferroni
or the improved Dunn-Sidak procedure. (The
Bonferroni inequality is due to Boole. Cox,
1977, suggested a sequential adjustment of alpha
like the one that is due to Holm, 1979. He gave
credit for the suggestion to test the most
significant comparison at a Dunn-protected
alpha to Tippett in 1931, whereas O=Neill and
Wetherill,
1971, call the Dunn-Bonferroni
procedure Fisher=s Significant Difference
method, attributed to Fisher, 1935. For some
reason, Dunn=s name is too often not included in
references to these methods of error rate
control.)
Control at the familywise level assures
that the probability that one or more of the
comparisons is falsely rejected is at most the
desired alpha. Because the false rejection of one
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or more of the comparisons would lead to the
false discorroboration of the theory under test, it
is this error rate that must be controlled. Any of
the sequentially rejective testing procedures,
such as those of Holm (1979) or Shaffer (1986),
adjusts the Type I error rate assigned to the test
of particular comparisons as a function of the
results that have been obtained prior to the test
of the particular comparisons. This is legitimate,
however, because the rate of false
discorroboration of the theory is still controlled
at the desired level, which itself must be
predesignated.
Recently, some interest has been shown
in the false discovery rate (FDR) multiple
comparison procedure of Benjamini and
Hochberg (1995). The FDR is the expected
proportion of rejections that are false. Shaffer
(1995) suggested that a common misconception,
that alpha refers to the proportion of the rejected
hypotheses that have been falsely rejected, may
have been the reason for the interest in defining
and controlling FDR. Benjamini and Hochberg
(1995) concluded that familywise (FWE) control
is important “when a conclusion from the
various individual inferences is likely to be
erroneous when at least one of them is”
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995, p. 290), as, of
course, did Peirce and Neyman and Pearson.
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) showed that
when all of the hypotheses associated with the
multiple comparisons are true, and so the
omnibus null hypothesis is true, FDR is equal to
FWE, and so in this crucial circumstance, the
two procedures are equally viable.
There
are
other
circumstances,
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) felt, in which
the less stringent control of FDR is acceptable,
such as in exploratory analyses, especially
screening problems in which it is desired to
obtain as many potential discoveries as possible,
but at a controlled rate so as not overly to burden
the later confirmatory stage. When considering
the different approaches that may be used in
exploratory as compared with confirmatory
analyses, it is helpful to place the analyses in the
context of Peirce’s abductions and inductions or
of Popper’s conjectures and refutations. Because
there is an open admission policy toward
hypotheses, there is no need for any conjectured
relationship to pass a preliminary test, except for
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reasons of economy. In the abductive phase,
then, any level of alpha can be used that suitably
reduces the number of variables later to be tested
in an independent study, even values far higher
than the conventional five percent level. In the
confirmatory stage, however, it is absolutely
essential to decide on low and predesignated
values of the Type I and Type II error rates, so
that the tests are as severe as possible.
Satisficing
In order to test a theory in isolation,
instead of as a mix of theory, initial conditions,
and auxiliary theories, one must specify in
advance of experiment that aspect of the theory
that is under test and to assign the remainder,
including theories of measurement, to
unproblematic background knowledge. To deal
with the theory-ladenness of observations, one
must remember that the observations are
interpreted in terms of theories, including the
theory under test. In order to subject the theory
to a severe test, we must specify in advance of
the experiment what the potential falsifiers of
the theory will be, what observational outcomes
of the experiment will cause us to regard the
theory as falsified.
One of Peirce’s rules regarding
induction, the inferential method by which
hypotheses are tested, is that of predesignation:
the property for which a sample is proposed
must be specified before sampling, for otherwise
“it will always be possible to find some
character, however obscure, in which the
instances sampled agree, and whether the same
proportion of the entire class...has the property
will be simply a matter of accident” (Buchler,
1939, p. 246). Indeed, without predesignation,
“the induction can serve only to suggest a
question, and ought not to create any belief”
(Peirce, 1883, p.436).
Peirce (1958) wrote, “The essential
thing is that it shall not be known beforehand,
otherwise than through conviction of the truth of
the hypothesis, how these experiments will turn
out” (p. 58). In this regard, Berkson’s (1938)
observation is pertinent, that if “the result of
the...test is known, it is no test at all!” (p. 537).
But as discussed previously, it is known that the
probablility associated with a universal
generalization is zero. Recall that in Peirce’s

view, no theory is true, that Ritchie showed that
the probability of any inductive generalization is
zero, and that Carnap found that the degree of
confirmation of all genuinely universal
propositions was zero. Additionally, Peirce
claimed that laws of Nature, expressed as simple
formulae relating physical phenomena, “are not
usually, if ever, exactly true” (Peirce, 1878, p.
334), and finally, Lakatos (1978) opined “that
precise particular numerical predictions would
have zero measure” (p. 139). Such views are not
only expressed by philosophers, and the transfer
to statisticians’ views concerning the null
hypothesis is fairly straightforward. For
example, Kempthorne (1976) similarly offered
that “A potentially mystifying aspect of this
process is that no one, I think, really believes in
the possibility of sharp null hypothesesBthat two
means are absolutely equal in noisy sciences” (p.
772), and Anscombe (1956) wrote that “no one
expects any scientific theory to be complete and
exact (p. 25).
There are those who defend the
possibility of the truth of the point null
hypothesis. For instance, Frick (1995) offered as
an example of a true point null hypothesis one
involved in testing for evidence of extrasensory
perception (ESP), and Wainer (1999) considered
the case of measuring the speed of light in two
reference frames, wherein it is hypothesized that
light speed is the same in both experiments. Of
note is the fact that the claimed truth of both of
these point null hypotheses is based on the
assumption of truth of the theories under test,
dubious at best given the fallible nature of all
knowledge. In terms of the test involving the
speed of light, it has been conjectured (Webb et.
al., 2001) that certain physical constants such as
the speed of light, Planck’s constant, and the
charge of the electron have been decreasing with
time. And if the speed of light were decreasing,
then the hypothesis that the two experiments
would yield the same value would be false,
unless the experiments were conducted
simultaneously, again difficult according to the
special theory of relativity. The point to be
emphasized is that the falseness of point null
hypotheses is consistent with the fallibility of
theories.
In the case of Frick’s ESP example,
assume for the sake of argument that ESP is
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indeed not possible. In order to test this
hypothesis, a person is assigned to guess
pictures drawn on a set of cards that are held up
in a random order, and the actual content of the
card and the guess are recorded. It would be
expected that if the cards are selected and the
guesses are made at random, there would be zero
correlation between them. Unfortunately, neither
the guesses nor the card selection are truly
random. Diaconis and Mosteller (1989) pointed
out that “subjects guess in a notoriously
nonrandom manner’ (p. 856). Similarly, the
order of card selection would be made on the
basis of a random device, say a pseudo-random
number generator, whose properties are
excellent but not perfect. Indeed, MacLaren
(1992) showed that the usable length of a
pseudorandom sequence was the two-thirds
power of its period, after which the uniformity
of the sequence no longer conforms to that of a
true random sequence. Therefore, the
nonrandom sequences of guesses and cards
selected will evidence a nonzero correlation. In
any experiment, not only must the theory under
consideration be true in all respects, but all other
aspects of the conditions of experiment would
have to be perfectly controlled in order that the
value specified in the point null hypothesis be
true. This is not at all likely to occur.
This is not to say that it can not happen.
The complement to Peirce’s previously cited
insight that there is a difference between
certainty and a probability of unity is that an
event whose probability is zero is not
impossible. Consider being handed a lottery
ticket. If there are a finite number of possible
winners, then you have a finite probability of
holding the ticket with the winning number. But
if the population of possible winning numbers is
truly infinite, then your probability of winning is
zero, despite your having an actual ticket in your
hand. Analogously, although it is not impossible
that the numerical value specified in a point null
hypothesis is equal to the population parameter,
the probability that they are equal for an infinite
population is zero.
As a possible solution to the dilemma
posed by false point null hypotheses, Lakatos
(1978) suggested, “One could...argue...that
confirmation theory should be further restricted
to predictions within some finite interval of error
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(p. 139). Similarly, Anscombe (1956) concluded
that “we expect some discrepancy between the
deduced theoretical hypothesis and our
observations. We wish to know if the agreement
of observation with hypothesis is good enough
(p. 25). This notion of specifying a range within
which an effect is essentially zero corresponds to
Simon’s (1957) principle of satisficing and
Serlin and Lapsley’s (1985) good-enough
principle. As an example of the application of
the satisficing principle, consider the eclipse
experiment in which Einstein’s General Theory
of Relativity was found to have greater
predictive power than Newton=s theory (Dyson
et. al., 1920). The conclusion that light seemed
to be bent by a gravitational object according to
Einstein=s theory was acclaimed by Thomson
(1919) as the most important result obtained in
connection with the theory of gravitation since
Newton’s day” (p. 389). Yet the average of the
four widely differing experimental values was
off by 10% from theoretical prediction. When
asked about the discrepancy, Einstein said that
for the expert, this thing is not particularly
important.
It is felt that our best theories are close
to the truth, that is, that they evidence
verisimilitude, and perhaps that over time our
theories become closer approximations to the
truth. It is necessary to shift our focus to
providing a method that allows the conclusion
that the theory under test is better than the old
one, or that a single prediction is closer to the
truth, rather than simply that the difference is
nonzero or that the prediction is in error. We
could, of course, be wrong. But the emphasis
here is on drawing a conclusion concerning the
magnitude of an effect. As Anscombe (1956)
wrote in this regard, “When testing a theoretical
hypothesis, should we not in any case begin by
treating the problem as one of estimation, by
estimating the magnitude of departure from the
theoretical hypothesis” (p. 25). Often, the
hypothesis test and the estimation of magnitude
are considered separate parts of the analysis. For
example, Yates (1948) noted, “The first point
that struck the practical man was that
experiments in general performed two different
functions, one being to test the significance of a
certain hypothesis, and the other to estimate the
magnitude of the deviation from that hypothesis
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if, in fact, it was found to be, or was suspected
of being, untrue” (p. 204).
One reason for this apparent disconnect
between hypothesis testing and estimation by
confidence interval is that the traditional point
null hypothesis only allows the conclusion that
the parameter is not exactly as specified,
whereas the essential information to be obtained
in an experiment regards whether the parameter
is outside of the good-enough region.
Unfortunately, the classical Neyman-Pearson
confidence interval can not answer this question
well. In the traditional case, it is posited that the
test statistic has a certain distribution, given that
the parameter is equal to a specific value, and
the inversion of this distribution yields the
confidence interval for the parameter, given the
observed test statistic. But the results of the
hypothesis test can be significant, indicating a
nonzero effect, without the confidence interval
indicating that the magnitude of the effect is
important.
Of course, the logic underpinning the
standard confidence interval is solid. We can
legitimately reason that if the population mean
equals a particular value, then given the data, the
confidence interval can be derived using the
solid statistical principles offered by Neyman
and Pearson. The logic is impeccable. But
because the value specified in a point null
hypothesis has zero probability of being correct,
Descartes might have said, “I don't doubt the
validity of your inference, only the premise.”
Equally troubling is the finding by
Meeks and D’Agostino (1983) that the coverage
probability of the classical confidence interval is
liberal if one only constructs the confidence
interval after rejection of the point null
hypothesis. Instead, if the confidence interval is
derived from the inversion of the distribution of
the test statistic that would be used to test a
range null hypothesis, the interval answers the
question of interest regarding whether the
magnitude of the effect is large enough, there is
a nonzero probability that the range specified in
the null hypothesis covers the limit to the
population range, and the results of the
confidence interval and hypothesis test are
consistent. Hodges and Lehmann (1954) and
Serlin and Lapsley (1985, 1993) provided tests
of range null hypotheses that allow the

conclusion that an effect is large enough. An
example of the use of a range null hypothesis
test to show large effects was provided by
MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) in
the context of covariance structure modeling.
Examples of the use of confidence intervals that
provide good-enough information are given in
Steiger and Fouladi (1997), Cumming and Finch
(2001), Fidler and Thompson (2001), and
Smithson (2001).
In addition, range null hypotheses (and
confidence intervals) can be used to examine
theories that predict effects of at least a certain
magnitude by allowing the discorroborating
conclusion that the effect is smaller than that
demanded by the theory. The bioequivalence
literature introduced many tests that allow the
conclusion that an effect is small, as did Serlin
and Lapsley (1985, 1993), Rogers, Howard, and
Vessey (1993), and Seaman and Serlin (1998).
Serlin (2000) showed how such a test could be
used in a Monte Carlo study to establish that a
statistical procedure satisfies specified criteria
for robustness. As previously indicated for the
general case, in using any of these procedures,
the criterion for a large enough effect or an
effect that is small enough to discorroborate the
theory must be predesignated.
Implications for future research
In his book on games of chance,
according to David (1962), Cardano lamented
that the facts of probability that he discovered
contribute to mathematical understanding but
not to the gambler. It has been shown, however,
that quite to the contrary, the theory of
probability is essential to a rational scientific
methodology in the game against nature. Point
null hypotheses, like universal theories, are quite
probably false, as are the assumptions
underlying statistical tests. As Cox (1958) wrote,
“Assumptions that we make, such as those
concerning the form of the populations sampled,
are always untrue” (p. 369). It is essential, then,
that we be able to examine the verisimilitude of
theories through the application of severe range
null hypothesis tests whose assumptions are
themselves subjected to serious scrutiny. The
Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods
is particularly well-placed to advance statistical
methodology in this regard.
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In order to conduct a severe test of a
hypothesis, the Type I error rate of the statistical
procedure must be held as close as possible to its
predesignated size, and the power of the test
must not fall far from its specified level,
regardless of the nature of the populations
sampled. To this end, robust procedures for
testing range null hypotheses have to be
developed and investigated. The most difficult
problem to be addressed likely will involve
finding a means to incorporate the hypothesized
good-enough range, expressed in actual or
standardized units of the raw scale, into the
distribution-free procedure.
For example, in a one-sample test that a
theoretical prediction is no more than 0.2
standard deviations from the true value, the
satisficing range must be introduced in both the
hypothesis to be tested and the sampling
distribution of the test statistic. The satisficing
limit of 0.2 standard deviations must be
expressed in terms of the population median for
the range null hypothesis addressed by the
signed-rank Wilcoxon test, and the null range
must also be incorporated into the sampling
distribution of the signed-rank statistic. Similar
accommodations must be made in a multiplesample, multiple-predictor, and/or multiple
dependent variable test in which the null range is
specified in terms of a measure of association,
such as R-squared, or in terms of a function of
eigenvalues or the Mahalanobis distance.For
instance, if the range null hypothesis is stated in
terms of the squared multiple correlation
coefficient between a set of predictors and a
dependent variable, what are the corresponding
parameters and sampling distribution of the
sample statistic in a rank regression test of the
appropriate range null hypothesis?
Regardless of the nature of the
hypotheses and tests, the assumptions
underlying the procedures must be taken into
account. In the one-sample case, asymmetric
pre- and post-tests with unequal variances will
yield asymmetric difference scores, which
would violate the assumptions underlying the
matched-pair Wilcoxon test, as would having a
single asymmetric dependent variable. As with
the matched-pair Wilcoxon test, the properties of
the adjusted Mann-Whitney test of Fligner and
Policello (1981) and the modified Kruskal-
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Wallis test of Rust and Fligner (1984), which
accommodate unequal variances in multiplegroup tests of location, are affected by
asymmetry. Although much work has been done
in this regard, the properties of tests of
symmetry seem to depend on other properties of
the distribution, such as kurtosis (Antille,
Kersting, & Zucchini, 1982; Fan & Gencay,
1995; Brizzi, 2002), and so more work in this
area is needed. In addition, differing variances
and covariances of sets of difference scores in a
repeated
measures
design violate the
assumptions of the Friedman test and other
competitors (Harwell & Serlin, 1994). The
multiple group, multiple measure design would
analogously require nonparametric tests of
sphericity and homogeneity of covariance
matrices, as would the test of identity of
regression lines and the test of parallelism that is
used to examine hypotheses concerning
moderating variables.
Most importantly, the need for range
null hypothesis tests applies both to the test of
theory and to the tests of assumptions. That is,
the requirement of satisficing applies at all levels
of the scientific endeavor. Because theories are
improbable, a good-enough region must be
determined in advance of experiment, so that
potential falsifiers can be specified. This, in turn,
requires that a range null hypothesis be tested, in
order to determine if a discorroborating outcome
has occurred. And the test can only be
considered severe if the error probabilities are
held within an acceptable range of the
predesignated levels, according to a criterion of
robustness.
When examining whether or not the
assumptions underlying a statistical procedure
are satisfied, the hypothesis to be tested
concerning the assumptions must specify that
the statistical model that is conjectured to apply
to the data is a good enough fit, that is, that the
assumptions underlying the statistical test of a
substantive theory are met well enough that the
statistical test itself meets its criterion of
robustness. This means that a good-enough
region must be specified in a range null
hypothesis of the test of the validity of the
assumptions underlying the statistical test of the
substantive theory, and robust tests of these
range null hypotheses concerning assumptions
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need to be developed. To this end, Monte Carlo
studies of the robustness of procedures must
provide response surfaces reflecting the Type I
error rate and power as a function of the inexact
agreement of model and data. Pearson and
Please (1975), for example, present the Type I
error rates for the one- and two-tailed, one- and
two-sample t tests and tests of variances in a
series of graphs for varying kurtosis at specific
values of skewness. A researcher could
determine limits to the skewness and kurtosis
that lead to the two-sample t test, say, meeting a
criterion for robustness; then these limits, in
turn, would be implemented in range null
hypotheses in a pilot study to determine if the
skewness and kurtosis of the distribution of the
population from which the proposed sample is to
be drawn adequately meet the requirements for
robustness of the t test.
Conclusion
Attempts to attain knowledge as certified true
belief have failed to circumvent Hume=s
injunction against induction. Unfortunately,
Hume also showed that the search for probable
knowledge, that which Locke called opinion or
belief, also depended on an inductive principle.
Instead, theories must be viewed as unprovable,
improbable, and undisprovable (Lakatos, 1970)
because, in addition to Hume=s criticism of
justificationism, Peirce among others showed
that the empirical basis is fallible. Importantly,
though, as Whewell advocated, the method of
conjectures and refutations is untouched by
Hume=s insights.
The
implication
for
statistical
methodology is that the requisite severity of
testing is achieved through the use of robust
procedures, whose assumptions have not been
shown to be substantially violated, to test
predesignated
range
null
hypotheses.
Nonparametric range null hypothesis tests need
to be developed to examine whether or not effect
sizes or measures of association, as well as
distributional assumptions underlying the tests
themselves, meet satisficing criteria.
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